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ABSTRACT
This study contributes to the structural migrants’ integration
literature with its focus on a wider understanding of welfare-
based incomes among immigrants in the Netherlands. We
examined whether immigrants’ reliance on either unemploy-
ment benefits, occupational disabilities benefits, or social
assistance could be explained through human-capital and
social-capital determinants. We found that this foremostly
applies to social assistance–based incomes, presenting the
relevance of disentangling various welfare schemes. We
additionally proposed that more capital increases immigrants’
knowledge about the welfare schemes’ bureaucratic procedures
and that under the condition of lacking employment more
capital leads to higher chances for a welfare-based income, but
we found little support for this explanation.
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The literature on immigrants’ structural integration in European nation-states
often concerns immigrants’ unemployment trends and immigrants’ unemploy-
ment benefit recipiency (e.g., Gowricharn, 2002; Seibel & Van Tubergen, 2013).
We, however, propose that to get a better understanding of immigrants’ structural
economic position, a wider concept of benefit recipiency should be examined,
because being unemployed cannot be equated to receiving welfare.
Until now, the unemployment literature has often sought explanations in
human- and social-capital theory (e.g., Zorlu, 2013). Whereas human-capital
theorists argue that immigrants have a disadvantageous position in the labor
market due to, for example, educational discrepancies between immigrants and
the native population (Chiswick, 1979; Van Tubergen, 2006), social-capital
theorists emphasize immigrants’ hampered access to constructive native networks
within the receiving country (e.g., Seibel & Van Tubergen, 2013). Especially, host-
country-specific capital (skills and contacts acquired in the host country) is key in
defining immigrants’ positive economic outcomes (e.g., Lancee, 2012).
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Both capital theories root in the assumption that immigrants with more capital
are more successful in the host country’s labor market because they have the skills
or the contacts that contribute effectively to job search (Van Tubergen, 2006). The
theory, thus, implicitly presumes that more capital results in more knowledge
that is employable. We wish to put the capital theory’s assumption to the test by
alternatively formulating that if this assumption adds up, immigrants with host-
country-specific capital are not only more successful in the labor market but, in
the case of having no income, are also more likely to successfully apply for welfare
support. One of the major obstacles of finding the way to welfare support is acquir-
ing information about welfare eligibility and the required bureaucratic procedures
(Currie, 2004; Hernanz, Malherbet, & Pellizzari, 2004). Hence, host-country-spe-
cific skills or contacts can usefully attribute to being successful in the labor market
and to the search for information about benefit programs’ application procedures.
We will use the definition of welfare-based income to refer to immigrants’
reliance on one of the three following benefit programs in the Netherlands: unem-
ployment benefit, occupational disabilities benefits, and social assistance. Social
assistance is a means-tested scheme that does not depend on previous performed
labor and may have an unlimited timespan; whereas unemployment benefits and
occupational disabilities benefits depend on previously performed labor (contribu-
tion-based) and are short-term schemes. Therefore, contribution-based benefit
receipt is likely to reflect a temporary deprived economic position, when in fact
reliance on social assistance may demonstrate structural distance from the labor
market. Henceforth, we innovate the research by comparing explanations for these
different forms of welfare-based incomes.
In this contribution, the term immigrant will solely refer to first-generation
migrant. Register data from the Netherlands consistently report that immigrants
are at risk of falling under the social minimum (De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). In par-
ticular, immigrants from non–European Union (EU) countries are found to have a
great entitlement risk (Zorlu, 2011). We will home in on Dutch Antillean,
Moroccan, Turkish, and Surinamese immigrants, the largest non-EU immigrant
groups in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). Their relatively economi-
cally worse-off position cannot be explained through institutional welfare access
differences, since the Coupling Act (koppelingsbeginsel) enables all immigrants to
request the same welfare services and, with small exceptions only in the first few
years, benefits.
In short, we claim that we should get a better understanding of immigrants’
broader understanding of benefit recipiency and what the role of human and social
capital therein is. We propose that immigrants with more capital are not only more
likely to receive income by means of employment instead of a welfare-based
income but also, in the case of lacking an income through employment, more likely
to acquire welfare support as compared to immigrants who lack this capital. By
testing these novel expectations from human- and social-capital theory, we aim to
answer the research question: To what extent can immigrants’ welfare-based
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income be explained through host-country-specific human- and social-capital
determinants?
The Dutch context
Immigrant groups
During the post-war reconstruction of Europe in the 1960s, a large-scale inter-
national recruitment of Moroccan and Turkish laborers has been initiated in
the Netherlands. The migration of these guest-workers consisted mostly of
unskilled laborers who were later followed by people from Suriname during
the 1970s and who left the colony before it became independent from the
Netherlands. Mainly since the 1990s, people from the Dutch Antilles arrived,
often unskilled laborers. Surinamese and Dutch Antillean immigrants share a
colonial past with the Netherlands and are more acquainted with the Dutch
language and customs than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Nevertheless,
despite that the Dutch Antillean islands are still a part of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, there are significant differences between the Dutch Antilles and
the Netherlands. For example, the main language carried throughout the edu-
cational curricula in the Leeward Antilles is foremostly the Creole language
Papiamentu rather than Dutch (Dijkhoff & Pereira, 2010). To conclude, the
four immigrant groups rely relatively more on benefits than the Dutch native
population, as shown in Figure 2 in the Appendices.1
Contribution-based benefits
By Dutch law, both the unemployment benefits and occupational disabilities bene-
fits are linked with previously performed labor. Therefore, they are contribution-
based benefits. An employee who works for a Dutch employer is insured for (1)
unemployment through the Act of Unemployment (Wet Werkloosheid, WW) and
(2) illness due to occupational reasons through the act for Work and Income
According to Labour Capacity (formally known as Law for Occupational Disabil-
ities).2 Self-employed laborers also have the possibility to issue insurance. Immi-
grants have the same rights as native Dutch, but these entitlements are coupled
with previous performed paid labor and, thus, it is not possible to receive these
benefits upon arrival. To be eligible for WW a few important conditions should be
met including that the employee should have worked at least 26 weeks within the
last 36 weeks. WW’s monthly allowance is based on the individual years of labor
service and has a timespan of 3–38 months.
When an employee falls ill due to occupational reasons, the employer stays pri-
marily responsible for the sick employee for at least 2 years. When the employee
does not recover before the labor contract expires, the employee falls under the juris-
diction of the Sickness Insurance (Ziektewet). The payment of this allowance (Zie-
kengeld) has a maximum of 24 months. When the employee is paid by means of
sick pay for longer than 2 years the employee has the opportunity to apply for Work
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and Income According to Labor Capacity (WIA), which was until 2005 known as the
Law for Occupational Disabilities (WAO) (Employee Insurance Agency, 2016). The
application procedure for an occupational disabilities benefit is complicated, because
of the examination procedure concerning the employee’s labor capacity and the vari-
ous tracks within the program after the examination’s outcome.
Means-tested benefit
The social-assistance program (Bijstand) provides a basic income for people who
cannot sustain themselves independently or through another social security pro-
gram. Bijstand is a means-tested program, owing to the fact that it is the last resort
of the Dutch social security system. To be eligible a person should be at least
21 years old (before 2004, 18 years). Since 2004, municipalities have been man-
dated with the task of deciding the monthly allowance, which partly depends on
the number of people living in the household (known as kostendelersnorm).3
Claiming social assistance in the Netherlands requires legal residence. And
although every immigrant has the right to apply for social assistance, immigrants
who have not obtained the required permanent residence permit could experience
a withdrawal of their temporary residence permit (Linkage Act). The latter, how-
ever, rarely occurs, as Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
restricts the legibility of the Linkage Act’s jurisdiction (Zorlu, 2011).
Theory and hypotheses
Human capital
Human capital literature originates in the field of economics (Becker & Chiswick,
1966), wherein the effect of individual skills implicating individual social outcomes
(such as being hired for a job) is highlighted (Nahapiet, 2011). The theory roots in
the assumption that human capital (such as obtained education) determines the
individual’s chances in the labor market. Henceforth, it is presumed that people
are rational actors who carefully invest in their labor market skills to reap the bene-
fits they will receive later in time (Becker & Chiswick, 1966). To test whether this is
a valid assumption, we deduce and examine the following two general theoretical
propositions.
The first is that if more human capital increases immigrants’ chances for being
employed (e.g., Heath & Yo, 2005) the likelihood of receiving a welfare-based
income should decrease. The assumption here is that people who have better quali-
fications and more knowledge applicable to the labor market in which they operate
have better chances in the labor market (Bourdieu, 1986). Second, departing from
the same assumption, we can hypothesize that under the condition of lacking a
paid job, human capital also increases knowledge about the procedures of how to
apply for a benefit and how to successfully obtain one.
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Human capital and lower risk for welfare-based incomes
The human capital theory has established that education, obtained labor experi-
ence, and language proficiency are key in defining who is successful in the labor
market and who is not (e.g., Heath & Yo, 2005; Van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2005;
Zorlu, 2013). We expect that these factors will be helpful in avoiding a welfare-
based income as well. We, however, anticipate that the extent of the attributional
character of these factors differs for the various forms of welfare-based incomes.
First, special interest is paid to the possible misfit of education obtained in the
country of origin and the receiving country’s labor market. Especially when it con-
cerns structured labor markets, wherein people’s occupational chances depend on
the host country’s educational institutions and neatly designed job applications.
Consequently, educational credentials from other educational systems than that of
the host country are less understandable for employers, resulting in hampered
access to the labor market (Zorlu, 2013). We expect that this will particularly affect
immigrants’ chances of receiving social assistance, because benefits that are contri-
bution-based presume previous performed labor in the Netherlands and, thus,
access to the labor market. We formulate our first hypothesis: Immigrants who
have not been enrolled in a Dutch educational program are more likely to receive a
social-assistance-based income than immigrants who have been enrolled in a Dutch
educational program (H1) and the difference is less for contribution-based benefit-
based incomes (H1a).
Second, studies also show that, despite possible higher credentials, immigrants
often accept unskilled jobs with lower earnings (e.g., Heath & Yo, 2005). Unskilled
labor requires physical strength (such as carrying heavy materials) and handling
risky materials (such as cleaning detergents), which in turn increases the risk of
occupational disability. The effect of previous performed labor is anticipated to act
with a time lag and expected to be key regarding occupational-disabilities-benefit
recipiency. Thus, our second hypothesis states: Immigrants who perform or have
performed physically demanding labor are more likely to receive an occupational-
disabilities-benefit-based income than immigrants who have not performed physi-
cally demanding labor (H2) and the difference is less so for unemployment-benefit-
based incomes and social assistance-based incomes (H2a).
Third, the most often discussed host-country-specific human capital is language
acquisition of immigrants in the country of destination (e.g., Van Tubergen &
Kalmijn, 2005). Contemporary modern Western labor markets are increasingly
service-offering-based. Hence, the requirement of good language acquisition is rel-
evant for a majority of job openings. Dutch language proficiency will therefore be
a hurdle for immigrants in accessing the Dutch labor market at the first place
(Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2014). We, thus, anticipate that poor comprehension of the
Dutch language, first and foremost, increases immigrants’ chances of relying on a
social-assistance-based income due to a lack of labor market access. Additionally,
we anticipate that employees with a lower Dutch proficiency will be the first
employees who will be dismissed when the employer seeks organization reform or
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wishes to achieve budget cuts. This leads to our third hypothesis: The higher the
proficiency in the Dutch language, the less likely that immigrants receive a social-
assistance-based or unemployment-benefit-based income (H3) and this association
will be less strong for an occupational-disability-benefit-based income (H3a).
Human capital and more means for welfare-based incomes
Besides actual welfare eligibility, the literature on benefit entitlement suggests that
what most determines people’s benefit take-up is whether they know about their
welfare eligibility (e.g., Currie, 2004). This accords with the human-capital theory’s
underlying assumption that better equipped immigrants are successful economi-
cally because they are more informed about the host-country’s labor market. By
examining our second proposition, we can test the human-capital assumption fur-
ther. Are immigrants with human capital better equipped to find their way through
the welfare state’s bureaucracy and successfully apply for welfare support when
they lack a paid job?
We expect that education obtained in the Netherlands and a higher proficiency in
the Dutch language contribute to gaining knowledge about bureaucratic procedures.
Though general information about various Dutch welfare schemes can be found in
various languages other than Dutch, detailed instructions of benefit application pro-
cedures are mostly given in the Dutch language solely, limiting knowledge to immi-
grants who comprehend the Dutch language better. This would be especially true for
the occupational-disabilities-benefit receipt, for its application procedure is, in com-
parison to the other two benefits, complicated. We therefore hypothesize: Under the
condition that people have no paid job, immigrants with more human capital are
more likely to receive an occupational-disabilities-benefit-based income than immi-
grants who lack this human capital (H4) and the difference will be less for an unem-
ployment-benefit-based or social-assistance-based income (H4a).
Social capital
The theory of social capital provides a useful second account of explaining immi-
grants’ welfare-based incomes. The theory outlines how an increase of networks or
social contacts has beneficial effects on a person’s economic attainment (Coleman,
1990). As with human-capital theory, social-capital theory assumes that useful con-
tacts will be employed for the benefit of structural economic positions. We wish to
put that assumption to the test by examining two theoretical propositions. First, we
examine whether a lack of social capital determines whether immigrants are successful
in the labor market. A lack of social capital will increase immigrants’ chances for
receiving a welfare-based income rather than receiving an income through paid labor.
Second, we expect that an increase of social ties affects immigrants’ knowledge about
the bureaucratic rules of welfare programs. Therefore, we presume that people with
more social ties have more opportunities to retrieve information about the welfare
programs’ application procedures (Sabates-Wheeler & Feldman, 2011). Thus, under
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the condition of lacking a paid job, social capital increases immigrants’ knowledge
about welfare programs’ bureaucracy and successfully apply for a welfare program.
Drawing on the research done by Pichler and Wallace (2007) on civic culture,
we would expect that both formal and informal social capital are resourceful
aspects. Formal social capital refers to people’s involvement in officially constituted
clubs and organizations within society, also known as participation in civil society
(Putnam, 2000), while informal social capital is defined as the resourcefulness of
casual bonds between people, such as friendships (Pichler & Wallace, 2007).
Social capital and lower risk for welfare-based incomes
Scholars within the field of migrant integration emphasize the positive impact of
ties with the native population in the country of residence, which is also known as
interethnic-bridging social capital (e.g., Nannestad, Svendsen, & Svendsen, 2008).
Immigrants who are embedded in the host-country’s labor market by means of
contacts with the native population will have an increased chance for a rich and
resourceful information transmittance. Consequently, these interethnic networks
enlarge immigrants’ chances for not only getting a job but also getting ahead and
performing well within the host country’s labor market (Lancee, 2012). Hence, we
expect that immigrants with formal or informal interethnic-bridging social capital
are less likely to receive an unemployment-benefit-based or occupational-disabil-
ities-benefit-based income than immigrants who lack this social capital (H5) and
the difference is less for a social-assistance-based income (H5a).
To be informed about job-application procedures, contact with people with a
similar background, which is also known as intraethnic-bonding social capital,
could be resourceful as well. Social networks consisting mostly of individuals with
a migration background are possibly better informed about the labor-market hur-
dles that immigrants have to overcome while in the search of a job. The similarity
of the individuals within the social network could supply immigrants with positive
returns (Lancee, 2012). Studies show, however, that intraethnic social capital
results mostly in employment within these regarded communities. Because of the
close ties, occurrences of dismissal are less likely within these communities (e.g.,
Heath & Yu, 2005). Therefore, we expect that the effect of intraethnic-bonding
capital will be stronger on the likelihood of dependence on labor-related benefits
than on social assistance because social-assistance recipiency does not necessarily
depend on a previously performed labor. Our sixth hypothesis states: Immigrants
with formal or informal intraethnic-bonding social capital are less likely to receive
an unemployment-benefit-based or occupational-disabilities-benefit-based income
than immigrants who lack this social capital (H6) and the difference is less for
social-assistance-based income (H6a).
Social capital and more means for welfare-based incomes
Assuming that social capital is beneficial for immigrants’ structural economic
position, both interethnic and intraethnic ties would subsequently also offer an
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increase of information transmission about welfare schemes and their application
procedures (Sabates-Wheeler & Feldman, 2011). We can relate this to our second
interpretation of the role of social capital concerning immigrants’ chances for a
welfare-based income. On the one hand, it is feasible that interethnic-bridging
networks are better informed about the Dutch benefit system than intraethnic
networks members of these networks well equipped or better embedded in the
Dutch nation state. On the other hand, intraethnic-bonding social capital pro-
vides immigrants with rich information on the application procedures for bene-
fits and the hurdles that specifically immigrants have to overcome (Sabates-
Wheeler & Feldman, 2011). This providence of rich information for the occupa-
tional-disabilities-benefit procedure, as the application and procedures for this
benefit are fairly complicated. Therefore, we hypothesize: Under the condition
that people have no paid job, immigrants with more social capital are more likely
to receive an occupational-disabilities-benefit-based income than immigrants who
lack this social capital (H7) and the difference is less strong for receiving an unem-
ployment-benefit-based and social-assistance-based income (H7a). Figure 1
presents a visualization of this study's hypotheses.
Figure 1. Hypotheses as proposed. Panel A: welfare-based income compared to paid employment;
Panel B: welfare-based income compared to no personal income.
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Data and methods
Data
We pooled three Dutch survey migrant data sets to get a sufficient number of
respondents depending on benefits to enable us to test our hypotheses: SPVA-
2002, NELLS-2010, and SIM-2011 (De Graaf, Kalmijn, & Monden, 2010; De
Koning & Gijsberts, 2002; Statistics Netherlands, 2011). The sample sets are based
on a two-stage stratified sampling technique; municipalities were selected first,
after which households were randomly selected (De Graaf et al., 2010; Groeneveld
& Weijers-Martens, 2003; Korte & Dagevos, 2015). The sampling procedure of the
municipalities includes regional location and degree of urbanization. Therefore,
the sampling procedures are biased to a small degree due to the dense immigration
concentration in the urban areas.
The SPVA-2002 and SIM-2011 questionnaires were set out among Dutch Antil-
lean, Moroccan, Turkish, and Surinamese immigrants, whereas the NELLS-2010
questionnaire was set out among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants between the
age of 15 and 45 specifically.4 The face-to-face interviews were conducted in Dutch
or the targeted mother tongue, reducing the possibility of non-response. The net
response rates among first-generation immigrants (after correcting for incorrect
register data due to factors such as moved or deceased respondents) varied between
43% for Surinamese immigrants (SIM-2011) and 56% for Turkish immigrants
(NELLS-2010). Generally, the response rates among Turkish immigrants were
higher than among other immigrant groups (SPVA-2002: 52%, NELLS-2010: 50%,
SIM-2011: 56%). For more detailed information about the response rates, we refer
to Table 3 in the Appendices. This Table presents the sex and age distributions of
Dutch register data, SPVA-2002, NELLS-2010, SIM-2011, and the final merged
data set. Additional information about data collection, sampling procedures, and
response rates can be found in the targeted codebooks (De Graaf et al., 2010; Groe-
neveld & Weijers-Martens, 2003; Korte & Dagevos, 2015).
Dependent variable
In both the SPVA-2002 and the SIM-2011 questionnaire, the respondents
answered whether they receive one of the listed welfare benefits and which of
the descriptions applied best regarding what they do in a regular week—for
example, in paid work, looking after the home, or unable to work due to
occupational disability. In the NELLS-2010 questionnaire, respondents were
directly asked to indicate their most important source of income. Subse-
quently, we have constructed the dependent variable welfare-based income and
its categories: (1) unemployment benefit, (2) occupational-disabilities benefit,
and (3) social assistance. If respondents answered that they did not have a
personal income, they were coded using a fourth category (4) no personal
income. Respondents who indicated that they work less than 12 hours per
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week while indicating that, for example, taking care of the home applies best
to their situation are likewise coded as (4) no personal income. Respondents
with their main mean of income provided through labor while the description
of paid labor applies best are coded as (0) labor or self-employment (referred
to as labor). Respondents who have an additional benefit to complement their
paid labor but whose main mean of income is still through paid labor are also
coded as (0) labor. We excluded respondents with pension funds, capital or
other benefits as their main mean of income from the analyses.5
Human capital variables
Education obtained abroad is measured with a dummy variable education abroad.
The variable is derived from the respondents’ indication whether they obtained
education from (0) Dutch educational institutes or (1) foreign educational insti-
tutes. Respondents who were at least once enrolled into a Dutch educational pro-
gram were coded as the reference category (0). Respondents who had a missing
value on the education abroad variable but migrated to the Netherlands before the
age of 18 are coded as the reference category as well, owing to the compulsory
attendance age in the Netherlands, while respondents who did not obtain a
diploma from elementary school, or higher level, are categorized as (1) education
abroad.
To measure the physically demanding performed labor in their current job,
or when respondents who were not in paid labor at their last performed job,
we created two dummy variables: (1) no professional career (containing
respondents who have never performed any form of paid labor) and (2) physi-
cally demanding job with the reference category (0) physically nondemanding
labor.6 To distinguish between physically and non–physically demanding
labor, we followed the International Standard Classification of Occupations
2008 (ISCO-08) skill level procedure.7 In the NELLS-2010 data set, an ISCO-
08 variable was given; for the SPVA-2002 and SIM-2011 data sets we con-
verted the SBC92 classification to an ISCO-08 classification by means of a
published converting scheme.8
To indicate the Dutch language proficiency of the respondents we operational-
ized the respondents’ estimation of their own speaking abilities with regard to the
Dutch language and created the variable Dutch language proficiency. Due to scale
differences between the various data sets, we standardized the given answers
enabling a data set merge. The higher the score for Dutch language proficiency, the
stronger the respondents’ Dutch speaking comprehension.
Social capital variables
For the analyses, we operationalized two kinds of social capital—formal and infor-
mal—while accounting for the migrant composition.
Regarding the operationalization of formal social capital, in the SPVA-2002 and
SIM-2011 it is asked whether the respondents are members of any of the 11 listed
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organizations and clubs; in the NELLS-2010, seven organizations and clubs were
listed. Furthermore, the respondents had to score whether the composition of these
organizations and clubs contained members from their own migrant background
(intraethnic) or whether they contained members with various backgrounds
including native Dutch. This resulted in the following four dummy variables with
the reference category (0) no membership: (1) clubs and societal interest organiza-
tions with none or few immigrants, (2) migrants and religious organizations with
none or few immigrants, (3) clubs and societal interest organizations with mostly
immigrants, and (4) migrants and religious organization with mostly immigrants.
The former two dummy variables represent formal bridging social capital (inter-
ethnic), whereas the latter two refer to formal bonding social capital (intraethnic).
The reference category contains the respondents who consistently answered no
regarding the listed membership possibilities.
A good indication of informal social capital is interaction with friends. Hence,
we have chosen to operationalize whether the respondents have native Dutch
friends and whether they have friends with a similar ethnic background. We cre-
ated the following two dummy variables: (1) Dutch friends (reference category is
[0] no Dutch friends) and (2) country of origin friends (reference category is [0] no
friends from the country of origin). The dummy variable Dutch friends refers to
informal bridging social capital (interethnic). The SPVA-2002 survey question
asked respondents whether they have friends or acquaintances who were born in
the Netherlands. Both the NELLS-2010 and SIM-2011 survey questionnaire asked
respondents whether they have friends who were born in the Netherlands. In the
questionnaires, no definition of friends is given. Therefore, what is considered as a
friend is in the perception of the respondents.
The latter dummy variable country of origin friends concerns the informal bond-
ing social capital (intraethnic). Both the SPVA-2002 and NELLS-2010 asked the
respondents whether they have friends (friends and acquaintances regarding the
SPVA-2002 questionnaire) who were born in their country of origin. For the SIM-
2011 we derived the country of origin friends variable from the respondents’ con-
tact frequency during their spare time. The respondents who answered that they
never see or speak to their friends who were born in their country of origin or that
the question did not apply to their situation were coded as (0) no country of origin
friends (reference category), assuming they have no friends (or at least no close
friends) from their country of origin.
Control variables
For the analyses we included the control variables country of origin, age, sex, educa-
tional level, marital status, number of children in the household, and data set source.
Respondents were asked in which country they were born. By means of dummy
variables we created the variables (1) Morocco, (1) Turkey, and (1) Suriname, with
the reference category (0) Dutch Antillean. Second-generation migrants are
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excluded from the analyses.9 Age is measured in years and is restricted to people
between the age of 15 and 64 years, enabling a representation of the labor force.10
Sex is measured through a dummy variable with women as reference category. The
educational level variable measures the level of the highest obtained education or,
when still studying, the educational program currently enrolled in, in eight catego-
ries. To measure immigrants’ household composition, we coded the following
three dummy variables with the reference category (0) single: (1) relationship
for immigrants’ who are in a non-cohabiting relationship, (2) cohabiting and/or
married, (3) divorced or widowed. We derived two dummy variables for (1) 1 or 2
children in the household and (1) 3 or more children in the household and a refer-
ence category (0) no kids in the household. Finally, two dummy variables, (1)
NELLS-2010 and (1) SIM-2011 with reference category (0) SPVA-2002, control for
the three data sets.
Missing data
We confined the sample to first-generation migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Suri-
name, or Dutch Antilles who were between age 15 and 64 years and who did not
have a missing value for the country of origin, welfare-based income, or age vari-
able; this reduced the number of respondents to 3,144 for the SPVA-2002 sample,
1,516 for the NELLS-2010 sample, and 1,907 for the SIM-2011 sample. Thereafter,
we restricted the sample by excluding respondents’ who were fulltime students
(2.2% of the SPVA-2002 respondents, 6.6% of the NELLS-2010 respondents, and
8.1% of the SIM-2011 respondents) which makes a merged sample set of 6,189
respondents. By using a multiple imputation procedure, we imputed values for
respondents who had invalid values on one of the independent or control varia-
bles.11 Five data sets were estimated and we used the imputed regression coeffi-
cients of the pooled data set including 6,189 respondents (Ruben, 1996). The
descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendices.
Method
For our data analyses we employed multinomial regression models to test our
hypotheses. This enables a series of comparisons between categories with the refer-
ence category set as main mean of income through labor (Kleinbaum & Klein,
2002). The first multinomial logistic regression contains the human capital, social
capital, and control variables with labor as the reference category. Through this
model we test whether the expected effects of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are sup-
ported. The second model includes the same components, but instead no personal
income is taken as the reference category while excluding people with paid employ-
ment. Therefore, this model estimates what the chances are to rely on specific wel-
fare-based income as compared to having no personal income, given that
immigrants have no employment. This model thus tests whether Hypotheses 4
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and 7 are supported. We ran additional analyses to probe whether the effect on one
of the concerning benefits is higher or lower compared with the other benefits.
Results
Human capital
Table 1 presents the results obtained from the first multinomial logistic regression
model with reference category labor as main mean of income (results for the con-
trast with people who have no personal income are presented in Table 6 in the
Appendices). Table 2 shows the results of the second multinomial logistic model
excluding people in paid employment and with no personal income as the reference
category. For Hypothesis 1, we expected that, despite the respondent’s educational
level, a respondent who was not enrolled into a Dutch educational program would
have an increased chance of receiving a welfare-based income rather than receiving
income through paid labor. Although educational level itself has the expected
effect, the effects of having obtained an education abroad are, as shown in Table 1,
not significant for any of the welfare benefits. Therefore, we have to refute both
Hypothesis 1 and its addendum, 1a.
In line with Hypothesis 2, Table 1 shows that immigrants’ chances of receiving
an occupational-disabilities-benefit-based income, instead of an income through
employment, is greater for immigrants with a physically demanding profession
(OR: 1.720, p < .001) than for immigrants with a physically nondemanding job.
This finding supports Hypothesis 2. Additionally, we observe the same pattern
regarding immigrants’ social-assistance-based income (OR: 1.869, p < .001). The
results of an additional multinomial logistic model, with occupational-disabilities-
benefit-based income as the reference category, show that the odds ratios of both
unemployment-benefit-based and social-assistance-based incomes are insignifi-
cant.12 Hence, an effect of physically demanding labor being larger for
occupational disabilities-benefit-based incomes, compared with unemployment-
benefit-based or social-assistance-based incomes, is not found. And, thus, the
addendum to Hypothesis 2, 2a, is not supported.
Furthermore, immigrants’ likelihood of receiving a social-assistance-based
income, compared to receiving an income through paid employment, is greater for
immigrants who have no professional career (OR: 16.433, p < .001) than for immi-
grants who perform or have performed non–physically demanding labor.
Although this is expected, we also find a puzzling effect for immigrants who indi-
cated that they have never started a professional career in the Netherlands at any
point in their lives but that their income is unemployment-benefit-based (OR:
4.301, p < .001) or occupational-disability-benefit-based (OR: 4.022, p < .001).
These results are somewhat counterintuitive because both benefits are only accessi-
ble after having a professional career (since they are contribution-based schemes).
This might be related to erroneous answers in the surveys (e.g., an answer about
J. A. J. RENEMA AND M. LUBBERS140
Ta
bl
e
1.
M
ul
tin
om
ia
lL
og
is
tic
Re
gr
es
si
on
M
od
el
1
(R
ef
.P
ai
d
La
bo
rV
s.
W
el
fa
re
-B
as
ed
In
co
m
e)
,C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
,S
ta
nd
ar
d
Er
ro
rs
,S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e
Va
lu
es
,O
dd
s
Ra
tio
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
O
cc
up
at
io
na
ld
is
ab
ili
tie
s
So
ci
al
as
si
st
an
ce
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
H
um
an
Ed
uc
at
io
n
(r
ef
.o
bt
ai
ne
d
in
N
et
he
rla
nd
s)
O
bt
ai
ne
d
ab
ro
ad
.0
04
(.1
39
)
1.
00
4
¡.
05
9
(.1
01
)
.9
43
.0
39
(.1
03
)
1.
03
9
Jo
b
(r
ef
.p
hy
sic
al
ly
no
nd
em
an
di
ng
)
Ph
ys
ic
al
ly
de
m
an
di
ng
jo
b
.2
17
(.1
68
)
1.
24
3
.5
42
(.1
30
)*
*
*
1.
72
0
.6
26
(.1
49
)*
*
*
1.
86
9
N
o
pr
of
es
si
on
al
ca
re
er
1.
45
9
(.3
02
)*
*
*
4.
30
1
1.
39
2
(.2
63
)*
*
*
4.
02
2
2.
79
9
(.2
40
)*
*
*
16
.4
33
D
ut
ch
la
ng
ua
ge
pr
ofi
ci
en
cy
(z
sc
or
e)
¡.
11
0
(.0
76
)
.8
96
¡.
08
2
(.0
56
)
.9
21
¡.
19
0
(.0
57
)*
*
.8
27
So
ci
al
D
ut
ch
fri
en
ds
(r
ef
.n
o)
D
ut
ch
fr
ie
nd
s
¡.
45
3
(.1
60
)*
*
.6
35
¡.
52
9
(.1
22
)*
*
*
.5
89
¡.
40
3
(.1
25
)*
*
*
.6
69
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
(r
ef
.n
o
m
em
be
rs
hi
p)
Cl
ub
or
so
ci
et
al
in
te
re
st
gr
ou
p—
no
ne
or
fe
w
¡.
61
3
(.2
64
)*
.5
42
¡.
06
9
(.1
72
)
.9
33
¡.
80
2
(.2
22
)*
*
*
.4
48
M
ig
ra
nt
s
or
re
lig
io
us
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n—
no
ne
or
fe
w
.3
30
(.5
12
)
1.
39
1
.4
13
(.3
33
)
1.
51
1
¡.
19
2
(.3
64
)
.9
12
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
fri
en
ds
(r
ef
.n
o)
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
fr
ie
nd
s
.1
69
(.1
92
)
1.
18
4
.1
57
(.1
31
)
1.
17
0
¡.
05
1
(.1
35
)
.9
50
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
(r
ef
.n
o
m
em
be
rs
hi
p)
Cl
ub
or
so
ci
et
al
in
te
re
st
gr
ou
p—
m
os
tly
.0
57
(.2
11
)
1.
05
9
¡.
19
9
(.1
91
)
.8
20
¡.
27
3
(.1
95
)
.7
61
M
ig
ra
nt
s
or
re
lig
io
us
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n—
m
os
tly
¡.
51
4
(.2
12
)*
.5
98
¡.
24
2
(.1
43
)
.7
85
.0
81
(.1
50
)
1.
08
5
Co
nt
ro
l
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
(r
ef
.D
ut
ch
An
til
le
s)
M
or
oc
co
.6
19
(.2
24
)*
*
1.
85
8
1.
22
4
(.1
79
)*
*
*
3.
40
1
.3
43
(.1
59
)*
1.
40
9
Tu
rk
ey
.7
87
(.2
24
)*
*
*
2.
19
7
1.
26
2
(.1
78
)*
*
*
3.
53
3
.0
13
(.1
62
)
1.
01
3
Su
rin
am
e
.0
67
(.2
31
)
1.
06
9
.1
80
(.1
73
)
1.
19
7
¡.
40
4
(.1
54
)*
*
.6
68
Se
x
(r
ef
.f
em
al
e)
M
al
e
.0
73
(.1
43
)
1.
07
6
¡.
48
3
(.1
08
)*
*
*
.6
17
¡.
58
3
(.1
11
)*
*
*
.5
58
Ed
uc
at
io
na
ll
ev
el
¡.
23
6
(.0
41
)*
*
*
.7
90
¡.
24
0
(.0
30
)*
*
*
.7
87
¡.
33
1
(.0
33
)*
*
*
.7
18
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
(r
ef
.s
in
gl
e)
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
¡.
21
5
(.2
37
)
.8
07
¡.
01
6
(.1
92
)
.9
84
¡.
38
9
(.1
70
)*
.6
78
Co
ha
bi
tin
g/
m
ar
rie
d
¡.
87
0
(.2
04
)*
*
*
.4
19
¡.
37
1
(.1
55
)*
.6
90
¡1
.6
89
(.1
61
)*
*
*
.1
85
D
iv
or
ce
d/
w
id
ow
ed
1.
04
5
(.3
35
)*
*
2.
84
3
.9
57
(.3
45
)*
*
2.
60
3
.9
16
(.3
12
)*
*
2.
50
0
Am
ou
nt
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
ho
us
eh
ol
d
(r
ef
.n
o)
1
or
2
ch
ild
re
n
ho
us
eh
ol
d
¡.
11
6
(.1
86
)
.8
90
¡.
16
2
(.1
28
)
.8
50
.2
41
(.1
43
)
1.
27
2
3
or
m
or
e
ch
ild
re
n
ho
us
eh
ol
d
.0
07
(.2
15
)
1.
00
7
¡.
40
0
(.1
48
)*
*
.6
70
.3
86
(.1
57
)*
1.
47
1
Ag
e
.0
58
(.0
35
)
1.
06
0
.4
15
(.0
27
)*
*
*
1.
51
5
.1
65
(.0
26
)*
*
*
1.
17
9
D
at
a
se
ts
ou
rc
e
(r
ef
.S
PV
A-
20
02
)
N
EL
LS
-2
01
0
¡.
20
9
(.2
09
)
.8
12
¡1
.1
39
(.1
90
)*
*
*
.3
20
¡1
.1
70
(.2
02
)*
*
*
.3
10
SI
M
-2
01
1
.6
32
(.1
57
)*
*
*
1.
88
1
¡.
05
0
(.1
15
)
.9
51
¡.
20
8
(.1
23
)
.8
12
Co
ns
ta
nt
¡1
.8
96
(.4
02
)*
*
*
¡3
.2
75
(.3
16
)*
*
*
¡.
26
4
(.2
92
)
Co
x
&
Sn
el
lR
2
.4
60
¡2
LL
(d
f)
9,
89
4.
09
8
(9
2)
N
ot
e.
To
ta
lN
D
6,
18
9.
Ba
se
lin
e
m
od
el
x
2
13
,7
01
.5
33
.
 p
<
.0
5.

p
<
.0
1.

 p
<
.0
01
.
So
ur
ce
.S
PV
A-
20
02
,N
EL
LS
-2
01
0,
SI
M
-2
01
1.
JOURNAL OF IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUDIES 141
Ta
bl
e
2.
M
ul
tin
om
ia
lL
og
is
tic
Re
gr
es
si
on
M
od
el
2
(R
ef
.N
o
In
co
m
e
Vs
.W
el
fa
re
-B
as
ed
In
co
m
e)
,C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
,S
ta
nd
ar
d
Er
ro
rs
,S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e
Va
lu
es
,O
dd
s
Ra
tio
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
O
cc
up
at
io
na
ld
is
ab
ili
tie
s
So
ci
al
as
si
st
an
ce
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
b
(S
E)
O
dd
s
Ra
tio
H
um
an
Ed
uc
at
io
n
(r
ef
.o
bt
ai
ne
d
in
N
et
he
rla
nd
s)
O
bt
ai
ne
d
ab
ro
ad
¡.
07
2
(.1
92
)
.9
30
¡.
19
3
(.1
68
)
.8
25
¡.
07
7
(.1
63
)
.9
26
Jo
b
(re
f.
ph
ys
ic
al
ly
no
nd
em
an
di
ng
)
Ph
ys
ic
al
ly
de
m
an
di
ng
jo
b
¡.
09
1
(.2
39
)
.9
13
.3
31
(.2
13
)
1.
39
3
.3
98
(.2
18
)
1.
48
9
N
o
pr
of
es
si
on
al
ca
re
er
¡1
.8
61
(.2
51
)*
.1
55
¡1
.8
21
(.2
13
)*
.1
62
¡.
52
9
(.1
95
)*
.5
89
D
ut
ch
la
ng
ua
ge
pr
ofi
ci
en
cy
(z
sc
or
e)
.0
51
(.1
02
)
1.
05
2
.0
90
(.0
88
)
1.
09
4
¡.
04
4
(.0
87
)
.9
57
So
ci
al
D
ut
ch
fri
en
ds
(r
ef
.n
o)
D
ut
ch
fr
ie
nd
s
¡.
05
3
(.2
09
)
.9
49
¡.
18
1
(.1
83
)
.8
35
¡.
00
7
(.1
78
)
.9
93
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
(r
ef
.n
o
m
em
be
rs
hi
p)
Cl
ub
or
so
ci
et
al
in
te
re
st
gr
ou
p—
no
ne
or
fe
w
.3
78
(.3
90
)
1.
46
0
.9
30
(.3
41
)*
2.
53
4
.1
70
(.3
64
)
1.
18
5
M
ig
ra
nt
s
or
re
lig
io
us
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n—
no
ne
or
fe
w
1.
43
6
(.7
78
)
4.
20
5
1.
40
5
(.6
51
)*
4.
07
4
.9
23
(.6
45
)
2.
51
6
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
fri
en
ds
(r
ef
.n
o)
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
fr
ie
nd
s
.3
70
(.2
74
)
1.
44
7
.3
66
(.2
34
)
1.
44
2
.0
82
(.2
22
)
1.
08
6
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
(r
ef
.n
o
m
em
be
rs
hi
p)
Cl
ub
or
so
ci
et
al
in
te
re
st
gr
ou
p—
m
os
tly
.2
47
(.2
99
)
1.
28
0
.0
19
(.3
03
)
1.
01
9
¡.
09
3
(.3
07
)
.9
12
M
ig
ra
nt
s
or
re
lig
io
us
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n—
m
os
tly
¡.
14
2
(.2
90
)
.8
68
.0
73
(.2
42
)
1.
07
6
.4
20
(.2
34
)
1.
52
2
Co
nt
ro
l
Co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
(r
ef
.D
ut
ch
An
til
le
s)
M
or
oc
co
¡.
07
5
(.3
37
)
.9
28
.2
52
(.3
08
)
1.
28
6
¡.
51
5
(.2
86
)*
.5
97
Tu
rk
ey
.3
41
(.3
35
)
1.
40
6
.4
92
(.3
05
)
1.
63
5
¡.
64
9
(.2
86
)*
.5
22
Su
rin
am
e
.4
73
(.3
94
)
1.
60
6
.4
74
(.3
62
)
1.
60
6
¡.
15
4
(.3
51
)
.8
57
Se
x
(r
ef
.f
em
al
e)
M
al
e
2.
02
4
(.2
14
)*
7.
57
0
1.
52
5
(.1
92
)*
4.
59
4
1.
35
8
(.1
93
)*
3.
89
0
Ed
uc
at
io
na
ll
ev
el
¡.
11
6
(.0
55
)*
.8
90
¡.
13
0
(.0
49
)*
.8
78
¡.
20
1
(.0
49
)
.8
18
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
(re
f.
sin
gl
e)
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
.2
22
(.4
29
)
1.
24
8
.4
41
(.4
11
)
1.
55
4
.0
49
(.3
88
)
1.
05
1
Co
ha
bi
tin
g/
m
ar
rie
d
¡2
.1
39
(.2
71
)*
.1
18
¡1
.6
92
(.2
49
)*
.1
84
¡2
.9
91
(.2
42
)*
.0
50
Am
ou
nt
of
ch
ild
re
n
in
ho
us
eh
ol
d
(re
f.
no
)
1
or
2
ch
ild
re
n
ho
us
eh
ol
d
.5
03
(.2
70
)
1.
65
3
.5
82
(.2
37
)
1.
78
9
.8
83
(.2
43
)*
2.
41
8
3
or
m
or
e
ch
ild
re
n
ho
us
eh
ol
d
.3
11
(.2
86
)
1.
36
4
.0
36
(.2
54
)
1.
03
7
.6
60
(.2
61
)*
1.
93
4
Ag
e
.1
33
(.0
48
)*
1.
14
2
.4
59
(.0
44
)*
1.
58
2
.2
61
(.0
42
)*
1.
29
8
D
at
a
se
ts
ou
rc
e
(r
ef
.S
PV
A-
20
02
)
N
EL
LS
-2
01
0
¡.
90
6
(.2
76
)*
.4
04
¡1
.8
06
(.2
58
)*
.1
64
¡1
.8
12
(.2
48
)*
.1
63
SI
M
-2
01
1
¡1
.2
10
(.2
38
)*
.2
98
¡1
.8
23
(.2
10
)*
.1
61
¡2
.1
04
(.2
07
)*
.1
22
Co
ns
ta
nt
.6
20
(.5
72
)
¡.
38
5
(.5
28
)
2.
32
5
(.4
97
)*
Co
x
&
Sn
el
lR
2
.4
94
¡2
LL
(d
f)
4,
34
2.
20
7
(6
6)
N
ot
e.
To
ta
lN
D
21
27
.B
as
el
in
e
m
od
el
x
2
5,
85
3.
68
.
 p
<
.0
5.
 
p
<
.0
1.
 
 p
<
.0
01
.
So
ur
ce
.S
PV
A-
20
02
,N
EL
LS
-2
01
0,
SI
M
-2
01
1.
J. A. J. RENEMA AND M. LUBBERS142
the partner’s income) or to improper benefit recipiency. Despite this inconsistency,
we decided to keep these respondents in our sample.13
With regard to Hypothesis 3, immigrants comprehending the Dutch language
better, have a decreased likelihood of receiving a social-assistance-based income
(OR: .827, p < .01) compared with receiving income through paid labor. The
expected effect of language proficiency on unemployment-benefit-based income,
however, was not found. Thus, immigrants’ language comprehension does not
seem to affect their job-loss chances once they are hired by an employer. Hence-
forth, Hypothesis 3 is partly supported, whereas addendum 3b is rejected.
Table 2 shows that our expectation that under the condition of no paid employ-
ment having more human capital would increase immigrants’ chances for a wel-
fare-based income cannot be confirmed. Both Dutch language acquisition and
education obtained in the Netherlands proved not to be significant predictors.
Hypothesis 4 and addendum 4a are refuted.
Social capital
In line with Hypothesis 5, the results presented in Table 1 show that members of a
sports or societal club are less likely to depend on an unemployment benefit (OR:
.542, p < .05) while such associations have no effect on occupational-disabilities-
benefit-based incomes. Additionally, the chances for depending on both contribu-
tion-based benefits instead of receiving an income through paid labor is lower (OR:
unemployment-benefit-based: .635, p< .001; OR: occupational-disabilities-benefit-
based: .589, p< .001) for immigrants with Dutch native friends. Additional models,
with unemployment-benefit-based income as the reference category, do not present
significant results,14 which means that the effect of native Dutch friends does not
significantly differ between welfare-based incomes. We reject addendum 5a.
Concerning Hypothesis 6, Table 1 does present a significant finding regarding
the expected effects of bonding social capital. Compared with receiving an income
through paid employment, the chances (OR: .598, p < .05) for receiving an unem-
ployment-benefit-based income decrease when immigrants join migrant or reli-
gious organizations consisting mostly of immigrants. This effect, of formal
bonding social capital, however, was not found with regard to an occupational-dis-
abilities-benefit-based or a social-assistance-based incomes. Hence, we found par-
tial support for Hypothesis 6 but no support for addendum 6a, because we
hypothesized that the chances for relying on a contribution-based–benefit-based
income would be affected.
Table 2 confirms our expectation that, under the condition that immigrants
have no paid employment, it is more likely that immigrants with social ties know
how to find their way through the benefits application procedures. This effect was
only found with regard to bridging social capital; thus, members of a sports or soci-
etal interest club (OR: 2.534, p < .01) or a religious organization (OR: 4.074,
p < .05) with only a few or no immigrants have indeed a higher chance to rely on
an occupational-disabilities-benefit-based income compared with immigrants
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having no personal income. This effect was not found for receiving an unemploy-
ment-benefit-based or a social-assistance-based income. Thus, while Hypothesis 7
is supported, 7a is not supported.
Finally, relating to our control variables, the results of Table 1 show that the
likelihood of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants relying on one of the three wel-
fare-based incomes instead of on paid labor is generally higher than the likelihood
for Dutch Antillean and Surinamese immigrants reliance on the the same welfare-
based incomes. This finding supports the presumption that immigrants from the
Dutch Antilles and Suriname have a less hampered access to the labor market
(Van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2005). Additionally, in the case of lacking a personal
income, both Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have a lower chance to rely on a
social-assistance-based income.
Conclusions and discussion
The current study has examined explanations of immigrants’ chances for receiving
a welfare-based income and adds to the current literature on immigrants’ struc-
tural economic positions in host countries. It moved beyond the current literature
since it identified which human- and social-capital indicators explain who relies
on various welfare-based incomes. We did this throughthe extension of the under-
lying assumption of human and social capital that more employable knowledge
increases immigrants’ chances to be successful in the labor market and decreases
reliance on the benefits. By presuming that this knowledge can also be called in
when immigrants are in need of access to welfare programs, in the case of lacking
a personal income, an increasing reliance on the benefits is generated. In line with
previous research, we found that human and social capital decrease the risk of rely-
ing on a welfare-based income (De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). We add that these forms
of capital not only affect direct labor-market outcomes and unemployment benefit
take-up but also that the effect carries over time by creating a stronger reliance on
social assistance in particular.
We did not find evidence for our assumption that human capital increases
knowledge about the bureaucratic procedures since, under the condition of having
no paid job, human capital does not increase the likelihood of relying stronger on
benefit-based incomes. On the other hand, we do find substantial effects with
regard to our social capital expectations. Immigrants who socialize with native
Dutch persons in a formal setting are more likely to find their way to an occupa-
tional-disabilities-benefit-based income. Therefore, this study supports the idea
that to prevent immigrants from falling into a more-structurally-vulnerable posi-
tion, ongoing integration processes are needed. Especially, when host countries’
social security systems involve complicated application procedures (Nahapiet,
2011).
Interestingly, and as unlike the previous condition (socializing with native Dutch
persons), immigrants who are members of a religious or migrants organization with
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people from a commonmigration background are more likely to have a paid job rather
than relying on an unemployment-benefit-based income. This finding follows the logic
of low dismissal occurrences within close-knit communities (Heath & Yu, 2005),
implying that intraethnic networks seem to guide immigrants to suitable job openings
within their own networks and that having social contacts in the native population is
not the only way of securing an economically stable societal position for immigrants.
Nevertheless, to gather more insight into how knowledge about the host country’s
labor market or the welfare state’s system exactly affects immigrants’mean of income,
more precise information about immigrants’ welfare knowledge should be collected. It
would also be fruitful to further examine the association between immigrants’ unem-
ployment trends and their trajectories toward social-assistance-based incomes. The
social-assistance program is mainly a welfare scheme of last resorts, but it simulta-
neously functions as the exit scheme for contribution-based benefits (Pellizzari, 2006).
It is likely that, over time, a proportion of immigrants have slid down from a contribu-
tion-based-benefit scheme into the support of the social-assistance program.
This study’s results support previous findings that human and social capital are
helpful in the labor market, keeping immigrants from relying on unemployment
benefits, disability benefits, or social assistance. In particular, for reliance on social
assistance, differences in capital have strong effects. We posited that human and
social capital also increases knowledge to find the way through the bureaucratic
procedures for applying for benefits. Here, however, only social capital seemed to
play a role. We call for a better understanding of the knowledge immigrants obtain
both about the labor market and the welfare procedures. For further research, we
suggest that the disentanglement of various welfare-based incomes is crucial, whilst
further strengthening the idea of the resourcefulness of social integration with the
native population to reduce economic inequality regarding immigrants (Nannestad
et al., 2008; Pichler & Wallace, 2007).
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Notes
1. For more information, see Statline //statline.cbs.nl.
2. Over time, the Ziektewet has been privatized, while being publicly steered. See //uwv.nl/
particulieren.
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3. There are exceptions, children who have reached the age of 18 years while living outside the
household or students until they are 21 years who live within the household are not counted as
adults. See //government.nl/documents/leaflets/2011/10/20/q-a-social-assistance.
4. Both NELLS-2010 and SIM-2011 sampled among native Dutch as well. We limited our
data to immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, and the Dutch Antilles.
5. This exclusion applied to 18.8% of SPVA-2002, 2.5% of NELLS-2010, and 17% of SIM-
2011 among respondents born in Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, or the Dutch Antilles.
6. See www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2012/14/de-nederlandse-beroepsbevolking-twee-afbake
ningen. Respondents with an army career were excluded from the analyses; this pertains to
less than 0.01% of SPVA-2002 respondents. Despite the required physical abilities of each
of the force’s ranks, the diversity between the ranks disallows a solid classification of physi-
cally demanding or nondemanding jobs.
7. For more information, see www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/.
8. See //cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/ methoden/classificaties/overzicht/ sbc/isco/default.htm.
9. 7.8% of SPVA-2002, 23.4% of NELLS-2010, and 25.5% of SIM-2011 respondents.
10. 2% of SPVA-2002 and 3.8% of SIM-2011 respondents.
11. SPVA-2002: marital status, < 0.1%; children in the household, 0.2%; educational level,
2.8%; Dutch language proficiency, 0.5%; formal membership dummies, 0.3%; Dutch
friends, 0.6%; country of origin friends, 0.6%. NELLS-2010: marital status, < 0.1%; 2%;
children in the household, 2.1%; educational level, 14%; education abroad, 4.8%; (non)
physically demanding job dummies, 4.2%; Dutch language abilities, 14.8%; formal mem-
bership dummies, 13.7%; Dutch friends, 13%; country of origin friends, 14.1%. SIM-2011:
educational level, 0.1%; (non)physically demanding job dummies, 2.5%; formal member-
ship dummies, 0.6%.
12. Or unemployment benefit: .723 (p > .05); Or social assistance: 1.087 (p > .10).
13. Or occupational disabilities benefit: .928 (p > .10); Or social assistance: 1.052 (p > .10).
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Appendix
Table 3. Distribution of Sex, Age and Country of Origin.
Register data–2008 SPVA-2002 NELLS-2010 SIM-2011 Merged data set
obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. %
Distribution of Dutch Antillean immigrants
Sex
Male 38,643 49% 344 44% 4 24% 274 51% 503 47%
Female 40,325 51% 444 56% 13 76% 259 49% 569 53%
Age
15–24 14,739 8% 44 7% 4 29% 85 16% 57 5%
25–34 45,389 26% 179 28% 6 43% 113 21% 265 25%
35–44 64,977 37% 197 31% 4 29% 126 24% 323 30%
45–64 51,226 29% 221 34% 0 0% 209 39% 427 40%
Distribution of Moroccan immigrants
Sex
Male 88,539 53% 730 74% 345 47% 229 51% 660 39%
Female 78,524 47% 261 26% 395 53% 218 49% 1040 61%
Age
15–24 14,619 10% 26 3% 48 9% 32 7% 54 3%
25–34 43,612 29% 231 30% 207 37% 82 17% 514 30%
35–44 49,259 33% 244 32% 282 51% 132 27% 692 41%
45–64 42,560 28% 273 35% 20 4% 244 50% 440 26%
Distribution of Turkish immigrants
Sex
Male 100,434 52% 807 267% 381 52% 219 46% 710 39%
Female 94,122 48% 302 27% 355 48% 252 54% 1123 61%
Age
15–24 12,311 7% 28 3% 50 9% 38 8% 72 4%
25–34 26,191 16% 246 28% 153 28% 94 20% 483 26%
35–44 52,110 32% 342 39% 304 56% 158 34% 799 44%
45–64 74,784 45% 258 30% 40 7% 181 38% 479 26%
Distribution of Surinamese immigrants
Sex
Male 83,678 45% 418 43% 12 52% 193 96% 535 46%
Female 101,606 55% 565 57% 11 48% 201 51% 630 54%
Age
15–24 13,863 20% 4 1% 1 5% 21 5% 9 1%
25–34 16,589 24% 147 19% 1 5% 56 14% 197 17%
35–44 15,503 22% 299 38% 17 85% 118 30% 431 37%
45–64 23,212 34% 333 43% 1 5% 199 51% 528 45%
Source. SPVA-2002; NELLS-2010; SIM-2011; Statistics Netherlands, 2016.
Figure 2. Registration data, benefit participation rates per country of origin.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics Categorical Data.
%
Welfare take-up
Income through labor 64.2
Unemployment benefit 4.8
Occupational-disability benefits 10.8
Social assistance 12.0
No personal income 8.2
Country of origin
Dutch Antilles 17.7
Morocco 30.4
Turkey 32.5
Suriname 19.4
Education abroad
Education obtained in Netherlands 62.4
Education obtained abroad 37.6
Physically demanding profession
No professional career 12.6
Physically nondemanding 70.0
Physically demanding 17.4
Membership formal social capital
No membership 63.2
Club or societal interest group—none or few 11.2
Migrants’ or religious organization—none or few 2.0
Club or societal interest group – mostly 10.5
Migrants’ or religious organization – mostly 13.1
Native Dutch friends
No 16.9
Yes 83.1
Country of origin friends
No 16.5
Yes 83.5
Sex
Female 44.9
Male 55.1
Marital status
Single 18.1
Relationship 13.4
Married or cohabiting 66.2
Widowed or divorced 2.3
Kids in household
None 29.3
One or two 45.4
Three or more 25.3
Data set source
SPVA-2002 49.6
NELLS-2010 22.1
SIM-2011 28.3
n 6,189
Note. Total N D 6,189.
Source. SPVA-2002, NELLS-2010, SIM-2011.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Interval Data.
Range Mean S.D.
Age (15–19 to 60–64 years) 1 - 10 5.689 .025
Education (no education – university) 1 - 8 3.917 .026
Dutch language proficiency (z-score) ¡3.08 - 1.03 ¡.220 .015
n 6,189
Source. SPVA-2002, NELLS-2010, SIM-2011.
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Table 6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results of “No Income” Category Model 1, Coefficients,
Standard Errors, Significance Values, Odds Ratio.
MODEL 1
b (SE) Odds Ratio
HUMAN Education (ref. obtained in Netherlands)
Obtained abroad .128 (.140) 1.136
Job (ref. physically nondemanding)
Physically demanding job .060 (.266) 1.061
No professional career 3.185 (.130)*** 24.173
Dutch language proficiency (z score) ¡.227 (.074)** .797
SOCIAL Dutch friends (ref. no)
Dutch friends ¡.431 (.156)** .650
Membership (ref. no membership)
Club or societal interest group—none or few ¡.531 (.273)* .588
Migrants or religious organization—none or few ¡.922 (.542) .398
Country of origin friends (ref. no)
Country of origin friends ¡.125 (.207) .883
Membership (ref. no membership
Club or societal interest group—mostly ¡.207 (.258) .813
Migrants or religious organization—mostly ¡.296 (.199) .744
CONTROL Country of origin (ref. Dutch Antilles)
Morocco .830 (.283)** 2.293
Turkey .610 (.236) 1.840
Suriname ¡.158 (.220)*** .854
Sex (ref. female)
Male ¡2.044 (.158)*** .130
Educational level ¡.130 (.289)** .878
Marital status (ref. single)
Relationship ¡.779 (.370)* .459
Cohabiting/married .838 (.225)*** 2.312
Divorced/widowed . . .
Amount of children in household (ref. no)
1 or 2 children household ¡.304 (.188) .739
3 or more children household .058 (.213) 1.060
Age ¡.101 (.037)** .904
Data set source (ref. SPVA-2002)
NELLS-2010 .618 (.215)** 1.855
SIM-2011 1.710 (.177)*** 5.527
Constant ¡2.236 (.381)***
Cox & Snell R2.460
¡2LL (df) 9,894.098 (92)
Note. Total N D 6,189. Baseline models x2 13,701.533.
p < .05. p < .01. p < .001.
Source. SPVA-2002, NELLS-2010, SIM-2011.
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